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Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant: 
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Defendant "Landowners11 and Cross-Respondents: 
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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a body corporate and politic 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation 
organized under the laws of the United States of America 
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CHRISTIANSEN ENTERPRISES, a general partnership 
REVA L. CHRISTIANSON, an individual general partner of 
Christiansen Enterprises 
DARLENE C. JACKSON, an individual general partner of 
Christiansen Enterprises 
ROYAL L. TRIBE, an individual 
RICHARD A. ISAACSON, an individual 
JULIA M. SMOOT, an individual 
JACK L. MECHAM, an individual 
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VERNER H. ZINIK, an individual 
DONNA R. ZINIK, an individual 
VERNER H. ZINIK, as Trustee, 
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STATES OF AMERICA, a New York corporation 
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a Maryland general partnership 
c. Parties interested in Okland-Foulger: 
FOULGER PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Maryland limited 
partnership 
OKLAND PROPERTIES LIMITED, a Utah limited partnership 
SID FOULGER, INC., a Maryland corporation 
JACK OKLAND, INC., a Utah corporation 
MARY FLINT FOULGER, an individual general partner of 
Foulger Properties Limited 
JAMES L. DAVIS and ANNE F. DAVIS, both individual 
general partners of Foulger Properties Limited 
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Defendant Lienholders; 
COMMERCIAL TOWER ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited partnership 
NORTHERN UTAH DRYWALL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY, INC., a Utah 
corporation 
MERVIN YOUNG, an individual 
HOWARD NELSON, d/b/a HOWARD NELSON DRYWALL 
TIMMERMAN STEPAN ASSOCIATES, a Utah professional 
corporation, d/b/a TIMMERMAN STEPAN ASSOCIATES 
KERBS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, A UTAH CORPORATION 
VALLEY GYPSUM, INC., a Utah corporation 
MARK REFRIGERATION, INC., a Utah corporation 
FLINTBATEMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah corporation 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION, a Utah corporation 
MAX LIEDKE, an individual 
SOULE STEEL COMPANY, a California corporation 
CECO CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation 
CLARON D. BAILEY, an individual 
JERALD M. TAYLOR, d/b/a TAYLOR ELECTRIC, INC. 
DAHN BROTHERS, INC., a Utah corporation 
UNIVERSAL ACCOUSTICS COMPANY, d/b/a UNIVERSAL ACCOUSTICS 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, a Utah corporation 
MONROC, a general partnership, consisting of M. K. HOLDING 
CORP., a Delaware corporation, and WELLCOM FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, a foreign corporation 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, Respon-
dent, and 
Cross-Appellant 
vs. 
DESERET TITLE HOLDING CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, et al., 
• Defendants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
and 
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah joint venture, 
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, a New York corpora-
tion, and OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, 
general partnership, 
Defendants and 
Appellants 
Case No. 20532 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
OF CROSS-APPELLANT ALLEN STEEL 
Cross-Appellant Allen Steel replies to the Answer of 
Defendant-Appellant Okland Foulger Company to Petition for 
Rehearing of Cross-Appellant Allen Steel and the Response to 
Petition for Rehearing of Landowner Defendants, This reply first 
addresses Okland-Foulger Co.'s lack of standing and then 
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addresses the arguments point by point, first in the order 
presented in the landowners1 response. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. OKLAND-FOULGER CO. HAS NO STANDING. 
Allen Steel seeks enforcement of its lien against 
interests of the landowners.1 Okland-Foulger Co. has filed a 
response but is not a landowner; it was the lessee/contractor. 
As such it has no standing on this issue involving only 
landowners. Okland-Foulger never addressed this issue at all in 
this Court nor in the trial court. Though perhaps not legally 
significant, Okland-Foulger's interest in shielding the 
landowners from the lien2 is a practical example of how certain 
interests of an owner and a statutory agent/lessee are 
intertwined. 
POINT II. ALLEN STEELfS LIEN SHOULD BE ENFORCED AGAINST 
THE LANDOWNERS. 
What is not in the defendants1 responses is as
 ( 
significant as what is. The responses do not counter at all 
Allen Steel's points that: 
i 
The landowners are listed on page i. 
2
 Allen Steel has judgment against Crossroads, Equitable 
Life and Okland-Foulger, and a lien against their interests. The 
remaining issue in this case is whether Allen Steel or the 
landowners will be the "prevailing party" to determine which will 
recover statutory attorneyfs fees from the other; if the 
landowners prevail, the lessee/joint venturers, who represent the 
landowners, will seek to offset what the joint venturers 
otherwise owe. by the amount of the landowners1 attorneys1 fees. 
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1. Other jurisdictions apply the simple, consistent 
rule that the lessor's interest is subject to a lien when 
the lessor requires the lessee to make the improvements. 
See cases cited from eight jurisdictions in Allen Steel 
Petition at 8-9, which overwhelming, uncontradicted 
authority landowners here choose to ignore. Those cases 
show, without question, that by exacting the promise to 
construct from the lessee, the lessor is held, by 
implication, to make the lessee his agent for accomplishing 
the construction. 
2. Agency for purposes of a mechanic!s lien is a 
broader principle than ordinary agency. See Petition at 7-8 
& n.7. 
3. A requirement of residual value at the end of the 
lease makes the rule easy to draft around by lease language 
requiring expensive improvements to be surrendered to the 
lessor but expressly not requiring (only permitting) that 
they have projected residual value. Petition at 4. 
These points were presented in the original petition for 
rehearing and are not readdressed here except as necessary to the 
reply. 
A. The landowners' interest is subject to the lien. 
By reguiring in the leases that Crossroads Plaza Associates build 
the shopping mall" and office building, the landowners impliedly 
made the lessee. Crossroads, their agent to accomplish the 
construction. The landowners1 first argument is that Zions First 
112289.mb.hdp.reply.asc 3 
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National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970) 
requires that "an agreement, express or implied, exists between 
the lessor or his agent and the contractor." They contend that 
it follows that Crossroads Plaza Associates was not an agent of 
the landowners according to traditional contract principles and 
therefore there can be no lien against the landowners. This 
overlooks that a statutory agency for mechanics1 lien purposes is 
broader than, and exists even in the absence of, a traditional 
contract agency. The concept of a broader statutory agency is 
expressly recognized in Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 
648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982). 
Interiors Contracting observed that notwithstanding the 
absence of an express contract between the lessor and the 
contractor, the lessor still "may have made [the lessee] its 
agent, at least to some extent, within the contemplation of the 
mechanics1 lien statute." 648 P.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). 
The Court relied on the statement in Masterson v. Roberts, 336 
Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1934) that: 
When the owner . . . clearly obligated the tenants to 
alter the building . . ., by reguiring substantial 
alterations, he made these lessees his agents within < 
the contemplation of the mechanicfs lien statutes. 
648 P.2d at 1388 (emphasis added). 
The landowners then argue that the agency implied from 
( 
the requirement that the lessee construct the improvements is not 
enough. The rejoinder to this is that the statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-3, does not require more. The landowners1 assert 
1 
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that "a line of cases beginning in 1898 require[s] both that the 
lease obligate the tenant to construct the improvements and that 
the construction of the improvements confer a benefit upon the 
landlord." That is wrong. First, the assertion incorrectly 
assumes that a exacting a promise from the lessee to construct 
the improvements does not in itself benefit the lessor. All that 
is required by the statute is construction by "any other person 
acting by his [the owner's] authority." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-3. As Zions First National correctly observed, fl[t]he 
critical-issue . . . is whether Zions [the lessor] impliedly 
authorized the . . . services and thus impliedly granted its 
lessee authority to bind its fee interest." 23 Utah 2d at 399, 
464 P.2d at 389. As Zions First National demonstrates, that 
authority is not diminished by the happenstance of later events 
such as whether or not the construction is actually completed, 
nor by what happens after an 85 year lease term if construction 
does occur. Id. at 395-99, 464 P.2d at 387-389. If the 
necessary authority is not express or implied, such as in a lease 
requirement, then and only then it is appropriate for the trial 
court to evaluate benefit to the landowers to determine whether 
such authority is implied on some other basis. That is the 
significance of Interiors Contracting. No such inquiry is needed 
here where the lease implies agency by expressly requiring the 
construction of the improvement. 
Second, the landowners1 assertion misreads the Utah 
cases. If not limited to its statements that more than knowledge 
U22S9Mib.hdp.Kpfy.asc 5 
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of the lessor is required to bind the lessor, Morrow v. Merritt, 
16 Utah 412, 52 P. 667 (1898), is squarely contrary3 to both 
Zions First National, which did not cite Morrow, and Interiors 
Contracting, which wisely did not cite Morrow for any proposition 
having to do with lease requirements. From beginning to end, 
Zions First National could not be more supportive of Allen 
Steel's position. There, the owner, escaped the lien solely 
because the improvements contemplated by the lease were not 
required. 
To restrict Interiors Contracting as defendants here 
suggest imposes on lien claimants burdens not supported by the 
statute and puts Utah at odds with the consistent rule followed 
in other jurisdictions with like statutes. See cases cited in 
Allen Steel Petition, 8-9. The landowners1 suggested rule would 
necessitate in every case a separate inquiry into the economic 
benefit to the owner based on speculative criteria that lend 
themselves to inconsistent results. That is not appropriate 
where the owner, through an express lease requirement, was a 
moving force behind the improvement, and unquestionably has the 
benefit of that contractual commitment. 
Rather, Interiors Contracting should be examined in 
light of one element of vital importance to the decision — the 
Court was there reviewing a summary judgment against the lien 
3
 A factual distinction based on the fact that the lease in 
Morrow only set out a certain dollar amount for improvements does 
not seem to be a difference of principle. 
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claimants. The Court stated: "We conclude that there are 
genuine issues of material fact which should be tried," 648 P.2d 
at 1388. Without attempting to list all possible factual issues, 
the Court referred to one that might arise as to improvements not 
expressly required; i.e. whether the improvements "clearly and 
actually conferred a value on Green Acres [the sublessor] when 
Hungry Hawaiian [the sublessee] terminated its tenancy." Those 
factual questions, which were to be resolved by the trial court 
are not important here except that the landowners try to confuse 
those questions with the legal issue. The legal issue in 
Interiors Contracting, however, was stated clearly and succinctly 
in the terms of the statute: "The precise issue, therefore, is 
whether the improvements made for Hungry Hawaiian [the sublessee] 
were made 'at the instance of the owner,1 Green Acres [the 
sublessor] 'or any other person acting by [its] authority as 
agent, contractor or otherwise.1" 648 P.2d 1386. 
The trial court here denied the lien on the sole ground 
that "there is no evidence that they [the landowners] would 
benefit from the construction of the Crossroads Project at the 
4
 The base lease was for ten years with a five year option. 
648 P.2d at 1384. About three years later, part of the property 
was subleased by Green Acres to Hungry Hawaiian, id., apparently 
for the roughly 12 year balance of the original 15 year total, 
id. at 1387. The Court was referring, not to anticipated value 
at the end of the sublease term but rather to an early 
termination of the sublease between Green Acres and Hungry 
Hawaiian that had already occurred, presumably because the 
sublessee's project failed financially, as it does not appear 
that the sublessor had any interest at the end of the sublease 
term. If the leases had gone full term, they would not have run 
out yet. 
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end of the leases," Conclusions of Law, para. 18 at R 4604.5 The 
trial court simply accepted the landowners1 argument that: 
. • . Allen Steel Company must prove that its 
improvements "actually conferred a value on [the owner] 
when [Crossroads Plaza Associates] terminated its 
tenancy." There is no evidence before the Court that 
the improvements installed upon the owners1 property 
will be of any value to the owners when the ground 
leases terminate — in 2070. . . . Allen Steel's lien 
must fail for lack of proof that the improvements, as 
depreciated for 90 years, have value. 
See Trial Brief of Equitable, Crossroads, Et Al. (7/25/84) at 42-
43. 
• The landowners finally contend that "Allen Steel . . . 
introduced no evidence of any benefit at any time to the 
landowners from the construction of the improvements." 
Landowners1 Response at 9. However, they never dispute at all 
the concomitant aspects of value6 that flow directly from the 
undisputed and compelling evidence that the landowners expressly 
required the improvements worth in excess of $4 0 million and 
bargained for the right to the improvements at the end of the 
lease. Landowners suggest there should be evidence of when the 
landowners could receive percentage rents. The answer is simple 
5
 Findings of Fact, para., 2 at R 4594 similarly found "no 
evidence that the useful life of the improvements extends beyond 
the lease period or that the landowners will benefit from the 
construction . . . . " See also the Court's comments at R 2935. 
("[T]he reason I don't think the lien attaches to the landowner's 
interest is because I don't think there's sufficient evidence 
that they would benefit from the project, the lease being for 
such a length of time.") 
6
 The value of the required improvements, for example, 
as security is discussed in our petition at 3 & n.4. 
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—precisely at the time and in the amounts for which they 
bargained. It matters not a whit when, how much and under what 
conditions they may receive those percentage rents. The 
landowners, architects of their own agreement in which they 
required the improvements, are in no position to ask: "How can 
one say the landowners were benefited by the improvements if the 
amount of the consideration flowing to the landowners is not 
known[?]" Landowners' Response at 9. Instead, the question is 
this: If the landowners had leased the land for 90 years for no 
consideration other than the promise of construction of the 
Crossroads mall, garage, and tower could the landowners now say 
the contract is void for lack of consideration?7 They say, "We 
made them spend tens of millions of dollars, but not for any good 
it would do us." 
Allen Steel's evidence shows exactly what is necessary 
for the lien, i.e., in the words of Interiors Contracting and the 
statute, that the improvements were provided at the instance of a 
person acting by the landowner's "authority as agent, contractor 
or otherwise." 648 P.2d at 1386. The essential nature of the 
landowner's benefit was their expectation that this deal would 
turn out well for them. Landowners are not entitled to a 
guarantee that they will come out ahead in the long run on a 
commercial development that they caused to occur. The landowners 
claim of "absolutely no benefit" could not have a more hollow 
One cannot refuse to pay the commission to the stock 
broker because the stock goes down. 
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ring. "[A]fter the fact, disclaiming any benefit from the 
improvements is not timely and is self-serving." Markely v. 
General First Equipment, 17 Wash. App. 480, 563 P.2d 1316, 1319 
(1977). The landowners got what they bargained for and should be 
held subject to the lien. 
B. The arguments of Okland-Foulger do not help the 
landowners. Okland-Foulger makes two additional arguments. 
First, it contends "contractual benefits under the lease 
agreements . . . are not part of the freehold." A lessor's 
interest, whatever it is, may be liened, and a remaining interest 
at the end of the stated lease term is not necessary.8 The lien 
attaches "to such interest as the owner may have in the 
property," Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, not only, as Okland-Foulger 
contends, to the owner's interest, after the end of the stated 
lease period. Nothing in the definitions cited by Okland-Foulger 
restricts any "freehold" interest to only that later period; 
during the lease, there is, in Okland-Foulger's words, "the 
landowners' title and ownership . . . encumbered by the leases 
and improvements," Okland-Foulger Answer to Petition at 4, as 
well as the right to the rents reserved. 
Second, Okland-Foulger contends that Allen Steel has 
failed to satisfy the requirements for rehearing, but argues only 
that Allen Steel is wrong on the merits. If this Court 
Interiors Contracting, as discussed supra at 7 n.4, 
treated as the "owner" a sublessor's interest that was 
coextensive in time with the sublessee's interest. 
U22S9.ntb.hdp.irply.asc 10 
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determines that Allen Steel is right on the merits, imposition of 
the lien on the landowners is appropriate. Okland-Foulgerfs 
statement that "Allen Steel's emphasis in its Brief • . . was not 
to consider benefits during the lease term" mischaracterizes 
Allen Steel's argument, which is in our cross-appellant's brief 
at 29-34 and our reply brief at 7-16. Even the landowners' 
response refutes Okland-Foulger's assertion that Allen Steel has 
changed its position by observing that Allen Steel did advance 
these same arguments on appeal. Landowners' Response at 3. 
. C. Allen Steel's Notice of Lien was proper for the 
Crossroads' proiect. The trial court found that "[t]he 
buildings, consisting of the Mall, garage and tower, cannot 
reasonably be apportioned as to the amount of construction or 
value of each owner's property," Findings of Fact, para. 2 at 
R 4594; see also R 2935. All of the authority involving 
separately owned tracts used jointly for a common improvement 
uphold a common notice of lien. Allen Steel Reply Brief at 3. 
Likewise, the only authority cited by any party demonstrates that 
a statute such as Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 applies when the 
construction is not for a public purpose. Allen Steel Reply 
Brief at 6. The Crossroads Project is by no means a "public 
building, structure, or improvement.,r Regardless, that a tiny 
piece of the land under the mall is owned by the City does not 
destroy the lien on the other private land. On these issues, we 
respectfully refer the Court to pages 2-7 of our reply brief, 
where our responses are fully set out. 
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CONCLUSION 
The landowners required the multi-million dollar 
improvements, making the lessee their statutory agent to 
construct it by implication. Allen Steel's lien should be upheld 
because that is the result consistent with Zions First National 
and Interiors Contracting, consistent with the statute, and 
consistent with the uncontradicted, undistinguished and 
established rule in other jurisdictions with like statutes. 
Alternatively, the case should be remanded to the trial court 
with directions that (1) a residual benefit need not necessarily 
be shown at the end of the stated lease period and (2) in light 
of Allen Steel's showing of the lease requirement, the landowners 
must bear the burden of establishing, if they so claim, that the 
requirement did not benefit them. 
DATED: November 28, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
By is/ Joseph J~- Pslnner 
Joseph J. Palmer 
H. Dennis Piercey 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant Allen Steel 
Co. 
U22S9.mbJidp.rtpty.toc 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on November 28, 1989, four copies each 
of the foregoing Reply In Support of Petition for Rehearing of 
Cross-Appellant Allen Steel were hand-delivered to: 
Bruce A. Maak, of Counsel 
Clark Waddoups 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Crossroads Plaza Associates 
and Equitable and Cross-
Respondent Landowners 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Jack Fairclough 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
4 0 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Okland-Foulger Co. and others 
interested in Okland-Foulger 
is I t^vyela Lopez-
1122S9.nibJulp.Kply.asc 13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
